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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Since this is a criminal case not involving a first degree felony, this Court has 
appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue: Whether a technician's affidavit/certificate regarding maintenance and 
certification of an intoxilyzer instrument used to measure appellant's blood alcohol level 
is 'testimonial' so that its admission into evidence when the technician is unavailable at 
trial violates appellant's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. 
Sub-issue 1: Whether Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515 (2005) which allows 
admission of a technician's affidavit/certificate in lieu of live testimony from the 
technician is constitutional under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. 
Sub-issue 2: The city respectfully states there is no sub-issue two (2) because 
the city does not seek to use a substitute technician/witness. If the city moved to do so in 
the trial court the city hereby abandons that effort and sub-issue on appeal. 
Standard of Review: Whether the technician's certificate/affidavit is testimonial 
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake City v. Williams, 2005 UT App 
493, TflO, 128 P.3d 47. A constitutional challenge to a statute also presents a question of 
law reviewed for correctness. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, f42, 99 P.3d 820. 
Preservation: The city agrees appellant preserved the issue and sub-issue(s). 
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TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The texts of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515 (2005), former Utah Code Ann. 41-6-
44.3 (2004); Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223(5) (2005); Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-101, -104, 
-120; Utah R. Evid. 102; 104(a); 802; 803(6), (8); 902 (2001); Utah Admin. Rule §§ 708-
14-8(4) (2004), 714-500 (2004) and the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution are in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The city charged appellant with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) 
with child present, a class A misdemeanor; open container, a class C misdemeanor; and 
violation of park curfew, an infraction. R. 1-2. The city sought to admit certified breath 
test affidavits/certificates (hereinafter "certificates" or "calibration certificates") prepared 
by a technician who was unavailable for trial. Those certificates would show the 
intoxilyzer instrument used to measure appellant's blood alcohol level was tested before 
and after appellant's arrest date and was found to be operating correctly. A copy of the 
certificates is in Addendum B. Appellant moved in limine against admission of the 
certificates. The trial court denied appellant's motion and ruled Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-
515, the statute under which the certificates are admissible, is constitutional. Appellant 
timely petitioned for interlocutory review, which this Court granted. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case has not been tried nor has evidence been presented. Appellant proffered 
the following facts for his motion to exclude his breath test result. "On March 31, 2005 at 
4:50 a.m. officers observed a white Chevy Lumina parked in the parking lot of a 
neighborhood park. Mr. George [appellant] was in the driver's seat and officers noticed 
bottles of alcohol in the car. Two other individuals were in the back seat. The officers 
had Mr. George do field sobriety tests and took him to the station to submit to a breath 
test. The results showed that Mr. George's blood alcohol level was .13." R. 41. 
According to the probable cause statement in the charging document the officers making 
the arrest were Officers Lowe, Simpson and Willis of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department. R. 3. 
The city charged appellant with three offenses: (1) driving under the influence of 
alcohol (with child present), in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502, a class A 
misdemeanor; (2) open container in vehicle, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-526, 
a class C misdemeanor, (3) violation of park curfew, in violation of Salt Lake City Code § 
15.08.020, an infraction. R. 1-3. 
The city seeks to admit evidence of appellant's blood alcohol level by admitting a 
breath test result card. To do so the city seeks to provide foundational evidence in the 
form of calibration certificates in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515 and 
UTAH ADMIN. RULE 714-500 (2004) to establish the instrument was operating correctly 
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when appellant's breath was tested. R. 79-80. When this case was set for trial the 
certified breath test technician ("technician") who prepared the applicable certificates was 
out of the country and unavailable to testify. R. 42. In his certificate the technician 
certified the instrument used to test appellant was working correctiy. Addendum B. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Since Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), was issued there has been a 
nation-wide challenge to use of calibration certificates. The argument against using them 
is that they are testimonial evidence, and thus their use in lieu of live testimony from the 
technician who prepares them works to violate confrontation rights in that a defendant is 
deprived of the opportunity to cross examine the absent technician. 
The overwhelming majority of appellate courts addressing this issue have held 
calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they are qualitatively different from 
both the testimonial statements at issue in Crawford and the abuses at common law 
against which the Framer's drafted the Sixth Amendment. Those qualitative differences 
are that calibration certificates are not accusatory; certificates are administrative in nature 
and neutral toward any particular defendant; certificates are for demonstrating the 
integrity of the instrument; certificates are prepared by technicians who do not engage in 
investigative or policing functions of law enforcement; certificates could just as well 
serve to exonerate a defendant as convict him or her; certificates do not contain 
information which is likely to be either bolstered or discredited by cross examination. 
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The city also argues they do not meet the primary 'purpose test' articulated in Davis v. 
Washington, 126 S.Ct 2266 (2006). (Davis was issued subsequent to some of the 
Crawford-calibration certificate cases on which the city relies.) In addition, this Court 
should hold the challenged statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515, is a constitutional 
statutory exception to the hearsay rule in that it allows calibration certificates to be 
admitted as self-authenticating documents without foundational testimony from the 
technician or any other person. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CALIBRATION CERTIFICATES ARE NONTESTIMONIAL AND 
THEREFORE THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
DOES NOT BAR THEIR ADMISSION. 
A. Brief description of Crawford. 
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the police questioned the 
defendant's wife Sylvia Crawford regarding the circumstances of a homicide. As this 
Court has summarized: "The defendant in Crawford was charged with assault and 
attempted murder. The state introduced a recorded statement made by the defendant's 
wife (Wife). Wife was unavailable to testify at trial because of Washington State's 
marital privilege. The defendant argued that the admission of the hearsay statements of 
Wife violated his Sixth Amendment privilege to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him." Salt Lake City v.Williams, 2005 UT App 493 ^|12; 128 P.3d 47. On appeal the U. 
S. Supreme Court held the admission of those statements in a criminal trial violated 
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defendant's confrontation rights. Crawford "replaced the existing standard for admission 
of hearsay statements against a criminal defendant with a requirem c i \ t 11 K I 11 c s 11111 e 11 u 1 
statements could be admitted <nil v i f the doclamnl was unavailable and if there had been a 
prior oppoilunit', for noss-examination." Williams, 2005 UT App 493 *p 1. In Crawford 
"the Court for the first time distinguished between "testimonial" and "nontestimonial55 
out-of-court statements." State v. Carter, I Crawford, 
however, left "for another day any effort to spell < nil a comprehensive definition of 
'testimonial1*" Williams, 2005 UT App 493 [^1L Though various definitions of 
"testimonial" were advanced in the Crawford briefs, the Court gave only four explicit 
definitions of "testimonial,55 which is thai il "'"applies a( a immmum l»» | I | pnoi testimony 
ataprelimmary hearing, |. ' | before a gi and jury, or [3] at a former trial and [4] to police 
interrogations/5 reasoning that "these are the modem practices with the closest kinship to 
the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.'5 Crawford, vl III,S I ill 
"In- contrast, nontestimonial hearsay can be admitted under generally accepted 
exceptions 1o Hie hrnrsnv rule without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment55 Williams. 
2005 UT App 493 f 11. "Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent 
with the Framers design to afford the States flexible .-v •; .L V . •. *. * i - * Vn? ;ay 
law - as does Roberts, and as woi lid ai I appi oach that exempted such statements from 
(ViiilVoniaiioi i < "lause scrutiny altogether.55 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. "Thus, before this 
court can apply the appropriate test, [it] must first determine whether the proffered 
7 
hearsay statements are testimonial or nontestimonial." Williams, 2005 UT App 493 [^14 
(citation omitted). 
Recently the U. S. Supreme Court further clarified the definition of "testimonial" 
in Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006), when it articulated a "primary purpose" 
test, holding that statements "are testimonial when circumstances objectively indicate ... 
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially 
relevant to a later criminal prosecution." Id at 2274. Davis held statements made to 
police during investigation of a crime in the context of a 911 call may be admitted in 
court without allowing a defendant to cross-examine the person who made the original 
statements when the primary purpose of those statements was to meet an ongoing 
emergency. Id. at 2277. 
The abuses Crawford described were where justices of the peace, who served in 
police investigative capacities, would conduct out-of-court interviews and reduce them to 
writing, or get letters from out-of-court witnesses, and then bring those writings to court 
to be read as testimony against a defendant without giving that defendant an opportunity 
to cross examine. The classic example was during Sir Walter Raleigh's trial wherein a 
letter written by his co-conspirator Lord Cobham was read in open court without Cobham 
being present. See, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
B. The overwhelming majority of courts have held calibration certificates 
are nontestimonial and thus are admissible at trial regardless whether 
the technician is available. 
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The overwhelming majority of courts, if not a unanimous majority, have held 
calibration certificates are nontestimonial and thus are admissible ai dial iv^iinih' > 
whether the technician is as ailable. See, e.g., State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 15 (Or. Ct. App. 
200S), review denied, State v. Norman, 132 P.3d28 (Or. 2006); Green v. DeMarco. 812 
N.Y.S.2d 772 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); People v. So Young Kim, 368 111. App. 3d 717 (Til 
App. Ct. 2006); State v. Carter, 125 P.3d 1001 (Monl. 'DOS); Jarrell v. State, N52 N i\2cl 
1022 (Ind. Ct App. 2006); Bohsancurt v. Kisenbere, 1 H> !> M * / i (Anz. Ct App. 2006); 
Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570 (Ky. 2006); State v. Godshalk. 381 N.J. 
Super. 326 (NJ. Sup. Ct 2005); People v. Kanhai, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N Y ( 'rim. i t. 
2005); Neal v. State, 635 S.E.2d 864 (t m i t App. ,MM)h>. 
The rationale fnrihese holdings was well-explained State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 15 
(< ii 11 App. 2005), review denied. State v. Norman, 132 P.3d28 (Or. 2006). Defendant 
was stopped for a headlight violation, odor of alcohol led to field sobriety tests, which 
showed impairment sufficient to arrest after \\hw\\ <iii mloxily/er test showed an illegal 
Mood alrnhol level nl'O I s \i inal the technician was unavailable. To lay foundation to 
admit defendant's breath test result card, the state offered two foundational 
documents/certificates certifying the intoxilyzer had been test.. S :\ r . etiniey IHTI >re and 
after defendant's arrest date aitd was working o -..;•! ; ••;•«! dates. 
Defendant objected to the certificates' admission on Crawford Sixth Amendment 
grounds, was overruled, was eventually convicted, and appealed. On appeal defendant 
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argued "that the technicians' statements averring the certification of the intoxilyzer 
machine constituted testimonial evidence, and that, because the technicians did not appear 
at trial and there was no opportunity to cross-examine them, the documents [were] 
inadmissible under Crawford." Norman, 125 P.3d at 17. The court was un-persuaded, 
reasoning that there is a qualitative difference between the calibration certificates and 
those described in Crawford. 
1. Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they are not 
accusatory. 
Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they are not accusatory. The 
Oregon court reasoned that calibration certificates "do not resemble the classic 
testimonial evidence at which the Confrontation Clause was aimed," meaning out-of-
court "ex parte examinations of [living] witnesses" whose testimony was "intended to be 
used to convict a particular defendant of a crime." Id. at 18; see also, Green v. DeMarco, 
812 N.Y.S.2d 772, 783 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) ("neither document in question accuses 
anyone of conduct that is criminal. They are neutral in character, relating only to the 
operation of the breath test instrument.... The ex parte statement at issue in Crawford 
was inculpatory in that it refuted the defendant's claim of self-defense."); People v. So 
Young Kim, 368 111. App. 3d 717, 719 (111. App. Ct. 2006) ("a breathalyzer certification is 
simply not accusatory: it does not accuse any particular person of any particular crime. ... 
[T]he evidence is not "against" any particular defendant. ... The evidence is not compiled 
during an investigation of a particular crime, as Crawford contemplates."); State v. Carter, 
10 
125 P.3d 1001, 1007 (Mont. 2005) ("certification reports are nontestimonial in nature in 
that they are foundational, rather than substantive or accusatory")-
Thus, since calibration certificates aic not accusatory, .is contrasted witli ex parte 
examinations at common law or Sylvia Crawford's statement to the police, they are 
nontestimonial, and their preparer - the technician - is constitutionally excused from 
appearing at trial. In a DUI the evidence that is accusatory is the actual breath test result 
card, because it identifies a particular defendant and is pivpaied against him or her for the 
specific pm poM1 nl hnth eriminal prosecution and civil driver license suspension, and that 
test result card is introduced at trial through a living witness - the arresting officer - who 
is and should be subject to "testing in the crucible of cross examii•:•- Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 61. 
2. Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they are prepared 
on an administrative schedule without regard to whether any 
particular defendant is arrested for DUL 
• a. Calibration certificates5 administrative li sum work.' 
The process by which calibration certificates come into being is statutorily 
prescribed by Utah Code Ann. 41-6a-515 (2005), former Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.3 
(2004). That statute reads in part: "The commissioner of the departn. i ^ ! . - u .:* sh 
standards for the administration and iiuerprelation of ehemieal analysis of a person's 
brealli " 1 'lah ( 'ode Ann, § 41-6a-515(a). Those standards are codified at UTAH 
ADMIN. RULE 714-500. Addendum A The certified breath test technician 
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("technician") must follow those standards when he or she checks and calibrates the 
intoxilyzer, and the information garnered from those actions are reduced to writing in the 
form of the calibration certificates. The technician must check and calibrate the 
intoxilyzer instrument every forty (40) days and certify it to be working correctly. UTAH 
ADMIN. RULE 714-500-5D(3). Should an intoxilyzer be found not working correctly it 
would be removed from service for repairs. UTAH ADMIN. RULE 714-500-4D(3). It is the 
data observed during calibration and testing procedures that are reduced to 
writing/transferred onto the calibration certificates by checking the "yes" or "no55 boxes 
on the calibration certificates, making notations thereon, if any, and swearing to the 
certificate's accuracy. The calibration certificates contain preprinted standard language, 
and within that standard language, the technician checks off boxes and fills in blanks. 
This writing or transference is done pursuant to UTAH ADMIN. RULE 714-500-5D(5), 
which reads, "Results of tests for certification shall be kept in a permanent record book 
retained by the technician. A report of the certification procedure shall be recorded on the 
approved form (affidavit) [calibration certificate] and sent to the program supervisor." Id. 
The approved form is the calibration certificate. The technician's name is on the 
calibration certificate. In this case the technician was Utah Highway Patrol (UHP) 
Trooper Byron Camacho and it is he who was unavailable when this case was set for trial. 
R. 42. The program supervisor's name is also on the calibration certificates. Calibration 
certificates are public records available for inspection by the general public at a published 
12 
address "during normal business hours ... more specifically the Utah Highway Patrol 
Training Section, 5681 S[outh] 320 West, Murray, UT 84107 " UTAH ADMIN. i<u i H -
500-4D(2). In every DUT case the arresting oifi(( as »• • -: : •*• ^ n -^i i; ! ,^ 
Utah Cmk Ann $ J M-22 i ( 1005) niusl sriul lo (lie Driver License Division the 
following within ten days of a DUI arrest: (a) the arrested person's confiscated driver 
license; (b) a copy of the DUI citation; (c) a signed DUI Report Form. These are used at 
the civil administrative driver license suspension hcai mj', ( '« i« "I hoannjri vJih h >,• 
• separate from flio crimmnl I )l II prosecution arising out of an arrest. The calibration 
certificates have a dual purpose. One purpose is for use at the civil hearing where the 
hearing officer must have them for foundation to receive the breath test resu H 
ADMIN.RULE708 H-sH), n> H'llio ho.iiiniiolTuvnlni's inn IM\O !lie calibration 
ccrtil icates, his or her finding and order is not valid. Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). A second purpose is for use by a prosecuting agency in a DT TI 
prosecution. 
b. Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they are prepared 
on an administrative schedule without regard to whether any 
particular defendant is arrested for DUI. 
Calibration certificate preparation simply is not case-dependent or fact-dependent 
because intoxilyzers are maintained and calibrated regardless wlial docs or docs no! 
happen on llio \nih\w io;uh\;iv* 1 IK'V -nv prepared before and after an arrestee's arrest 
(hie regardless whether he or she is arrested. 
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"[Certifications of breath-test machines is removed from the direct investigation 
or direct proof of whether any particular defendant has operated while intoxicated...." 
Jarrell v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1022, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding calibration 
certificates nontestimonial). Further, "the certificates are not prepared in anticipation of 
litigation in any particular case or with respect to implicating any specific defendant." Id. 
Rather, "[t]he periodic certification of breath test machines ... is mandated by ... 
regulations, regardless of whether the machine is ever actually used in an OWI 
investigation." Id. (emphasis added). 
Since calibration certificates are prepared as part of administrative routine without 
a particular defendant in mind, they are distinct from both ex parte common law 
examinations and Sylvia Crawford's statement to the police. 
3. Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they are directed 
toward reporting machine/instrument test results, not toward a 
defendant in a specific case. 
Calibration certificates nontestimonial because they are directed toward reporting 
machine/instrument test results, not toward a defendant in a specific case. The 
"Confrontation Clause is directed at the methodology of... prosecutorial examinations of 
potential witnesses ... for the purpose of establishing or proving a fact in issue in [a] case 
being prosecuted ... [rjather than being directed at evidence about the accuracy of a 
machine result." Norman, 125 P.3d at 18; see also, Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 129 P.3d 
471, 477 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) ("the type of evidence contained in calibration records 
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primarily abstract data output from a machine with no relationship to a particular 
defendant - is not the sort of evidence with which the Framer's were concerned") 
(emphasis added). 
A s writings cr
 s -, • * - e . i : ; u t ii'um an instrument, calibration 
certificates are not directed toward a particular defendant in a particular case as distinct 
from those in Crawford. 
4. Calibration certificates are nontestimoiiial because c 'hnicians 
do not function in an investigative or policing role. 
Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because technicians do not function in 
an investigative or policing role. Technicians do not act like current-day police officers 
patrolling for DI JIs and detectives who investigate spev ifie fuel allegations allcHedh 
committed by specific suspects in investigations of specific crimes, let alone like that of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English justices of the peace. As the Oregon court 
stated: "[T]here is no evidence on the record that the technicians were fundi* mmg as the 
proxy of the police investigation concerning (lie defendant " Noniian, 125 P.2d at 19. 
In atktii ii HI [ u]nlike police or prosecutorial interrogators, the technicians have no 
demonstrable interest in whether the certifications produce evidence that is favorable or 
adverse to a particular defendant.../' Id Thus, "the function of the. technicians Millers 
significantly from that of the p ublic officers who^e actions or methodology implicated 
confrontation issues at common law." IdL 
In a DUI the arresting officer who makes the traffic stop, conducts the field 
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sobriety tests, arrests and transports the arrestee to the station, and administers the breath 
test does function in a role analogous to the police in Crawford. It is his or her actions -
not the technician's - which are and should be subject to confrontation. 
In fact in this case the arresting officers and the technician were employees of 
different government agencies, the Salt Lake City Police Department and the Utah State 
Highway Patrol, respectively. R. 3, 42. 
5. Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because the technicians 
perform routine neutral administrative functions which could just as 
well exonerate a DUI defendant as convict him or her. 
Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because the technicians perform 
mechanical routine administrative functions which could just as well exonerate a DUI 
defendant as convict him or her: "A properly operating breathalyzer instrument could just 
as well prove innocence as guilt. Thus [the technician] was not bearing testimony against 
Respondent." Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky. 2006); see also. 
People v. So Young Kim, 859 N.E.2d 92, 94 ("it is conceivable a reading below .08 could 
... exonerate a suspect/') 
6. Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they contain the 
kind of information not likely to be either bolstered or discredited 
during cross examination. 
Calibration certificates are nontestimonial because they contain the kind of 
information not likely to be either bolstered or discredited during cross examination. 
While the technician is conducting maintenance checks pursuant to the administrative 
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rule, his or her actions consist of observing the instrument and recording/transferring 
neutral data output on pre-printed forms/calibration certificates. As such, certificates are 
"evidence ... as easily and reliably proven by the documents theim o - ^ . \ ;; 
testimony/'' Green v. DeMarco, 81J N.Y.S.2d 77?, 7 • ' <' ' - ** ^i. lOlo,. 
During i loss examination generally "the accused has an opportunity.. .of testing 
the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness" so the jury "may look at him 
and judge by his demeanor and the manner in which he gives his testimony w hetlici he Is 
worthy oft ;,.i, - iVlurray City v. Hall 6(>3 I> ^f H14, \.\U (Utah 1983). Butwhenone 
"consid *» N1 i he nature of [certificate] evidence ... together with the duty of the analyst to 
follow carefully delineated guidelines ... and the objective nature of the facts recorded, 
both the need for and the utility of confrontafu m a( III.H would ippcai to be tniniiiuh ' 
State v. Ruiz, : x V- 1995) (pre-Crawford case upholding 
admission of certificates in absence of technician preparer against Confrontation Clause 
challenge). 
Also, "there is no basis lor coiHvivinjj dial ,i Slair Polii r Inspector would violate 
Ins ilutv Jiiil certify thai a breathalyzer was functioning properly when the truth was to the 
contrary." Godshalk, 381 NJ. Super, at 332-33 (parenthesis omitted) (post-Crawford case 
holding calibration certificates nontestimonial). Neither is there e\ en any "moti v e to 
misrepresent" on c a - ^ i , - rrfvahs ~}\u\iu$c the ^ ^  ii- l^rw\ ;; [thetechnician's] 
lindings and a pa- .••'.* mi un a particular prosecution is too attenuated." State v. 
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Huggins, 659 P.2d 613, 616 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) fore-Crawford case upholding 
certificate admission against Sixth Amendment attack). Thus, "[t]o interrupt the public 
business by requiring" the technician to testify "would appear to serve no useful 
purpose..." because cross examination is not likely to show a change in recollection, a 
faulty conscience or motivation of interest in the outcome a particular case. Id. 
Thus there can be no utility to cross examining the technician when the certificates 
suffice. The policy interest in streamlining DUI trials is discussed infra. 
7. Calibration certificates do not meet Davis v. Washington's "primary 
purpose" test and therefore they cannot be characterized as 
testimonial. 
Davis v. Washington adopted a "primary purpose" test, holding that statements 
"are testimonial when circumstances objectively indicate that there is no ... ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution." Id., 126 S.Ct. at 2274. 
Appellant argues Davis's primary-purpose test requires this Court to hold calibration 
certificates are testimonial. Considered one at a time, however, the Davis factors show 
calibration certificates cannot be characterized as testimonial. 
a. Ongoing emergency: the city agrees when the technician calibrated the 
intoxilyzer there was no ongoing emergency. 
Appellant argues there was no ongoing emergency when the technician calibrated 
the intoxilyzer. In Davis the out-of-court statements defendant sought to exclude were 
made by his victim to a 911 dispatcher "as they were actually happening," and thus were 
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not excluded on confrontation grounds. Id. at 2276. The city agrees it cannot assert 
that when the technician checks the intoxilyzer there is an ongoing emergency. 
b. Primary purpose: calibration certificates do not have a "primary 
purpose,5' they have a "dual purpose." 
The primary purpose of the procedures leading to calibration certificates is to insure 
the integrity of the intoxilyzer. The certificates themselves do not have a primary 
purpose, they have a dual purpose. One purpose is at civil administrative driver license 
suspension hearings required as a matter of law. UTAH ADMIN. RULE 708-14-9(4), (5) 
(2005). If the hearing officer does not have them he or she cannot make a valid order 
regarding driver license suspension or revocation. Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). A second purpose is use as foundational documents for 
introducing the actual breath test result in criminal prosecutions for DUI. As a matter of 
logic, a thing cannot have a primary purpose and a dual purpose. It may have a primary 
purpose and secondary purpose, or it may have a dual purpose. 
The certificates do not name a victim, a perpetrator, or an offense of any kind 
whereas a victim's frantic 911 call may include all three. The Davis 911 caller told the 
dispatcher the suspect's name and, in colloquial terms, the crime (assault): "He's here 
jumpin' on me again. ... He's usin' his fists. ... It's Davis." Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2271. 
Thus, the calibration certificates do not meet the primary purpose test. 
c. Interrogation: the technician does not "interrogate" the intoxilizer prior 
to producing calibration certificates. 
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The technician does not "interrogate" the intoxilyzer prior to producing calibration 
certificates containing the out-of-court statement; he or she observes its neutral data 
output during maintenance checks and eventually reduces those observations to writing. 
At the time of the first maintenance check, which precedes an arrestee's arrest date there 
is no defendant to interrogate and no allegation of an offense to investigate. 
One form of "interrogation" in the DUI sense would be if the prosecution 
attempted to use incriminating statements or observations made by third parties, for 
example those made by other drivers, without having those third parties present to testify. 
Those third parties' statements would be inadmissible hearsay unless they were present at 
trial to be cross examined. 
Another is the arresting officer's observations of an arrestee's performance on 
field sobriety tests, blowing into the intoxilyzer and recordation of any statements the 
arrestee makes (e.g., "I was at the bar since noon.") which the prosecution may later seek 
to use. The arresting officer's presence at trial is required to introduce the evidence he or 
she gathers and he or she is thus subject to cross examination. 
d. Past events: the "past events" the technician observes do not relate to a 
"past crime" under Davis, 
The "past events" the technician observes do not relate to a "past crime" under 
Davis: "When we said in Crawford that interrogations by law enforcement officers fall 
squarely within the class of testimonial hearsay, we had immediately in mind (for that was 
the case before us) interrogations solely directed at establishing facts of a past crime, in 
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order to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the perpetrator." Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 
2276 (emphasis added; brackets, citations, quotations omitted). 
The "past events" the technician observes are not events of a past crime, and the 
information he or she supplies in the certificate cannot establish any element of a DUI. 
Nor do the technician's observations occur on the DUI offense date. In a DUI it is the 
arresting officer's observations (including the actual test result card), not the technician's, 
which relate to establishing the facts or elements of a past crime. The calibration 
certificates are prepared routinely in a 40-day administrative maintenance cycle 
"regardless of whether the machine [was] ever actually used in an OWI investigation." 
Jarrell 852 N.E.2d at 1026. 
e. The calibration certificates are not "potentially relevant to a later 
criminal prosecution" as Davis contemplates. 
The calibration certificates are not "potentially relevant to a later criminal 
prosecution" as Davis contemplates: "We do acknowledge ... certificates might be said to 
have been prepared in anticipation of litigation in one sense, in that... they may be used 
in future drunk driving prosecutions .... However, certification ... is removed from the 
direct investigation or direct proof of whether any particular defendant has operated a 
vehicle while intoxicated; the certificates are not prepared in anticipation of litigation in 
any particular case or with respect to any particular defendant." Jarrell 852 N.E.2d at 
1026; see also, Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky. 2006) ("[The 
technician] probably knows when he prepares his maintenance and test records that the 
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information contained therein might be used at a trial though probably not which trials.55) 
(parenthesis omitted). 
Davis contemplates the hearsay statements have an intended use against a 
particular defendant for a criminal charge arising out of the facts about which the 
statements are made, whereas as the calibration certificates do not. 
8. The cases on which appellant relies are both factually and legally 
distinct from this appeal. 
Appellant relies on Shiver v. State, 900 So. 2d 615 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2005), which 
is factually distinct from this appeal. In Florida the "breath test affidavit" serving as 
"presumptive proof of an arrestee's breath test and what Florida terms the "affidavit" 
(calibration certificate in Utah) apparently are combined in one card/document: "Critical 
here, the affidavit was also relied upon by the State ... to establish the date of 
performance of the most recent required maintenance." Id. at617.1 
In Shiver, the trooper, in addition to making the arrest, also signed a "breath test 
affidavit" in which he certified that another person - i.e., the breath testing technician in 
charge of testing the instrument - had certified the instrument to be working correctly. In 
other words the arresting trooper attested to certification of an instrument performed by 
another person. In the instant appeal the certificates were signed by the technician who 
himself inspected the intoxilyzer eventually used to test appellant's breath. Thus Shiver 
In Florida apparently usual practice is for arresting officers transport arrestees to a 
location where a separate breath testing technician administers the breath test. See, Belvin 
v. State, 922 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006), discussed infra. 
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is not better reasoned, it is factually and legally distinct from this appeal. 
Appellant relies on Belvin v. State, 922 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006), which 
specifically states it does not address the issue in this appeal: "petitioner has not raised the 
issue of whether those portions of the breath test affidavit pertaining to the maintenance 
and inspection of the breath test instrument violate the Confrontation Clause under 
Crawford." Id 
In Belvin the arresting officer transported the arrested driver to a breath-testing 
facility, after which a separate officer, the breath test technician herself, operated the 
instrument to get a breath test, and she also contemporaneously prepared the breath test 
affidavit - which in Florida apparently is a component part of the same card/document 
which gives the arrestee's BAC. But she did not testify at trial. The court overturned the 
conviction because the technician who elicited the incriminating evidence from the 
defendant (his breath result) was not at trial, not because calibration certificates (called 
affidavits in Florida) are inadmissible. They are admissible: "These statutory provisions 
[analogous to § 41-6a-515] permit the breath test affidavits to be admitted as a public 
records exception to the hearsay rule." IdL at 1048-49. Thus Belvin is not better 
reasoned, it is factually and legally distinct. 
Appellant relies on Martin v. State, 936 So. 2d 1190 (Ct. App. Fl. 2006). There a 
lab report showing test results of substances (cocaine and cannabis) seized directly from a 
specific defendant was prepared to prosecute a specific case was introduced without the 
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lab technician's presence at trial. Martin does not involve breath testing calibration 
certificates. The court held the report was testimonial and its introduction without the lab 
technician's presence at trial was a confrontation rights violation but that holding has no 
persuasive force here because that case is factually distinct. Id. at 1193. 
State v. Campbell 719 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 2006), on which appellant relies, also 
did not involve breath testing certificates, but rather a lab report similar to that in Martin, 
and that report was introduced to convict two co-defendants of marijuana possession. In 
Campbell there was a DUI charge but that does not appear to have been appealed, nor 
does the case report discuss breath testing calibration certificates. 
The question in State v. Bertui 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983), on which appellant 
relies, was whether "police reports of crimes" are admissible where defendant sought to 
admit his jail booking sheet showing the box for "intoxicated" checked off to prove his 
intoxication defense. The Utah Supreme Court held a defendant should be permitted to 
admit the police report of his arrest in his defense, but "[w]hen offered by the prosecution 
... they should ordinarily be excluded, except when offered to prove simple routine 
matters which Eire based on first-hand knowledge of the maker of the report and do not 
involve conclusions, and when the circumstances of their preparation indicate their 
trustworthiness." Id. at 1185. 
Appellant seeks to apply BertuTs language excluding police reports by arguing 
calibration certificates are analogous to police reports. Such a claim was made and 
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rejected in State v. Ward, 474 N.E.2d 300 (Ohio 1984). Defendant there sought to 
exclude "certified copies of police logs showing calibration of intoxilyzer equipment" 
under the public records exception to the hearsay rule. Ohio's public records exception, 
like Utah's, allows admission of public records without foundation regardless of witness 
availability, excluding "in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other 
law enforcement personnel." Id at 302. 
The Ohio court held the hearsay rule's exclusion language, "prohibits the 
introduction of reports which recite an officer's observations of criminal activities or 
observations made as part of an investigation of criminal activities." IcL However, "this 
phrase does not prohibit introduction of records of a routine, intra-police, or machine 
maintenance nature, such as intoxilyzer calibration logs" because "[s]uch routine records 
are highly likely to be reliable, and precisely the type contemplated as admissible by the 
public records exception to the rule against hearsay." Id. at 302. See also, Huggins, 659 
P.2d at 616 ("[a]n ordinary police accident report is often colored by the officer's 
judgment and frequently incorporates opinions gathered from second-hand sources who 
have a stake in pending litigation," whereas "the [certification] packet itself is merely a 
record of factual findings recorded in the regular course of business.. .made 
independently and well in advance of any particular prosecution.") 
The reasoning underlying Ward is consistent with that underlying Bertul in that 
calibration certificates are not subject to "perception, recall, the manner of language used, 
25 
or the soundness of conclusions by the author of the report," Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1185, in 
the same way police reports are, because an intoxilyzer technician almost robotically or 
mechanically records raw data output and checks off boxes on pre-printed 
forms/calibration certificates after he or she has set up the testing equipment. The same 
analysis distinguishes this appeal from Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 
1990), cited b)f defendant, wherein the jailer prepared an incident report to violate a 
specific defendant's probation. 
Appellant relies on State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, 122 P.3d 639. In Workman a 
lab technician personally took samples from a home where officers had served a search 
warrant and then analyzed them and determined they were contraband. Since the lab 
technician was unavailable for trial the State sought to have the lab technician's 
supervisor testify as a substitute witness. The Utah Supreme Court held it was error to 
have the supervisor testify for three reasons. First, the nature of the testing was subjective 
(the tests depended "upon subjective inferences by the testing party, based ... on their 
training and experience)." Id. at ^ 15. Second, given the nature of the tests, it would have 
been very difficult for the defendants to challenge the evidence without cross-examining 
those personally involved in the testing. Id. at Tf 17. Third, the testing involved was 
materially different from testing in other cases where the court allowed substitute 
witnesses in that the testing was not based on "promulgated, rigid guidelines and 
standards." Id at H 19-20. 
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Workman therefore is distinct for the following reasons. First, unlike the lab 
technician who collected evidence and tested it for a specific case, Trooper Camacho did 
not perform the calibration inspection to test a specific defendant or to aid in a specific 
prosecution. Second, there is no evidence that the testing done by Trooper Camacho 
involved any subjective elements. Instead, it appears that the testing is based on 
"promulgated, rigid guidelines and standards," making it more like cases where expert 
witnesses are allowed to substitute for one another. Id. Third, because there was no 
subjective element to Trooper Camacho's testing, this is not the type of evidence that 
appellant needs to be allowed to cross examine upon. Finally, the city does not seek to 
substitute one expert for another, as in Workman; if the city made that argument below it 
has abandoned it on appeal. Instead, Camacho will still be "testifying," he will simply be 
testifying via the calibration certificate, which is contemplated by § 41-6a-515. 
Therefore, under the analysis thus far, the clear weight of authority favors this 
Court ruling that calibration certificates are nontestimonial hearsay admissible regardless 
whether the technician is unavailable. 
C. Though calibration certificates are nontestimonial hearsay they are still 
hearsay evidence - that has survived Crawford's reach. 
Though calibration certificates are nontestimonial, they are still classic hearsay 
because they are out-of-court statements by an absent witness being offered for the truth 
asserted in them. 
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1. The trial court's ruling. 
The trial court ruled Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515 (former Utah Code Ann. 41-6-
44.3) is constitutional and that calibration certificates are admissible under it. Thus it did 
not need to reach traditional hearsay exceptions to make its ruling. R. 87, footnote 3. 
Addendum C. 
But clarification is needed as to what kind of hearsay calibration certificates are. 
And, importantly, under what exception are they admitted? Appellant's challenge to § 41-
6a-515's constitutionality affords this Court the opportunity to specifically hold that 
calibration certificates are self-authenticating documents under a statutorily-created 
hearsay exception whose foundational threshold for admissibility is equivalent to that of 
public records and are thus admissible without the technician's presence at trial. 
2. Calibration certificates are admissible under traditional hearsay 
exceptions. 
Post-Crawford decisions holding calibration certificates or their equivalent are 
nontestimonial characterize them variously as public records, business records, both 
public records and business records, and statutorily self-authenticating. See, e.g., 
Norman, 125 P.3d at 18 (public records); People v. Kanhai 797 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 
Crim. Ct. 2005) (business records); Godshalk, 885 A.2d at 973 (business records and 
official records); Walther, 189 S.W.2d 570, 573 (statutorily self-authenticating); Neal v. 
State, 635 S.E.2d 864, 866 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (statutorily self-authenticating). 
3. The public records exception has survived Crawford's reach because 
public records are by their nature nontestimonial. 
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Public records are an exception to the hearsay rule which has survived Crawford's 
reach because public records are by their nature nontestimonial: "there were always 
exceptions to the general rules of exclusion of hearsay evidence." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
56. (brackets and quotation marks omitted). "Most of the hearsay exceptions [at common 
law] covered statements that by their nature were nontestimonial - for example, business 
records....'5 Id, "To its credit, the Court's analysis of "testimony" excludes at least some 
hearsay exceptions, such as business records and official records." Id. at 76 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring). 
"Because the Sixth Amendment is implicitly deemed to incorporate the hearsay 
exceptions [already long] established at the time of the founding, it follows that modern-
day hearsay exceptions enacted by statute will not be deemed testimonial in nature if they 
parallel the hearsay exceptions that were not by their nature testimonial at common 
law...." Norman, 125 P.3d at 12. "[TJhere is no other [hearsay] exception at common law 
that has a more firm basis than the public records exception." Id. It follows that 
calibration certificates parallel a common law exception and their status as admissible 
without foundation testimony is undisturbed by Crawford, as this Court has recognized 
post-Crawford: "In contrast nontestimonial hearsay can be admitted under generally 
accepted exceptions to the hearsay rule without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment." 
Williams, 2005 UT App 493 111. 
The requested holding will "secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in 
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administration, and the elimination of unnecessary expense and delay." Utah R. Crim. P. 
1; see also, Utah R. Evid. 102. The trial court found the calibration certificates in this 
case were prepared consistent with § 41-6a-515 and this point is not in dispute. R. 85, 
footnote 2. Addendum C. 
4. Calibration certificates are self-authenticating documents under 
Utah § 41-6a-515, which is a statutory exception to the hearsay rule. 
This Court has ruled "Utah Rule Evid. 802 provides that hearsay is not admissible 
except as provided by law or by these rules. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 [now § 41-6a-
515] was enacted as a statutory exception the hearsay rule and its validity [has been] 
affirmed.... Rule 802 clearly contemplates that other statutory provisions may similarly 
apply as valid exceptions to otherwise inadmissible hearsay." Layton City v. Bennett. 741 
P.2d 965, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis in original; citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
5. Calibration certificates are self-authenticating documents which do not 
require the presence of a foundational witness prior to admission into 
evidence. 
Calibration certificates are self-authenticating documents which do not require the 
presence of a foundational witness prior to admission into evidence: "[A] certificate of 
inspection is self authenticating when it is prepared and executed, as prescribed in 
[Georgia's statute analogous to § 41-6-44.3]." Neal v. State, 635 S.E.2d 864, 866 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2006) (post-Crawford case holding calibration certificates are admissible non-
testimonial hearsay); see also, Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 572-73 (Ky. 
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2006) ("[maintenance and test records] were otherwise admissible without extrinsic 
evidence of authenticity, i.e., additional testimony of [the technician]") (post-Crawford 
case holding calibration certificates nontestimonial hearsay); United States v. Wilkinson, 
804 F.Supp. 263 (D. Utah 1992) ("the affidavits [calibration certificates] ... are self-
authenticating documents under Fed. R. Evid. 902(4). ... [t]he court finds that no 
additional testimonial foundation is required for their admission into evidence") (pre-
Crawford case challenging admission of certificates on "confusing terms"). In addition, 
calibration certificates are open for public inspection during regular business hours. UTAH 
ADMIN. RULE 714-500-4D(2). Thus, they are self-authenticating documents admissible 
without foundational testimony from the technician/preparer or from any other person. 
While these points may seem evident, the city has found no Utah state case 
specifically so holding, and Murray City v. Hall 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), discussed 
infra, has led to unnecessary confusion, delay and expense in Utah DUI prosecutions, as 
demonstrated by appellant's argument on this point discussed infra. 
6. Sound judicial policy supports holding calibration certificates 
are self-authenticating documents requiring no foundational testimony 
in this case or in any case. 
Sound judicial policy supports holding calibration certificates are self-
authenticating documents requiring no foundational testimony in this case or in any case. 
The reasons are evident from this appeal and from United States v. Wilkinson, 804 
F.Supp. 263 (D. Utah 1992). At trial the Wilkinson court ruled the calibration certificates 
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were admissible under § 41-6-44.3 (now § 41-6a-515) but on rehearing opined that it 
might have erred in so doing, and then ruled calibration certificates were admissible on 
alternate grounds under the public records exception to the hearsay rule, codified at Fed. 
R. Evid. 803(8). 
Nevertheless, defense counsel in Wilkinson, notwithstanding the court's ruling that 
calibration certificates were admissible under § 41-6-44.3 or the public records exception, 
still argued for the presence of some person in some capacity to attend trial to verify the 
public record's authenticity. 
When defendant "assert[ed] that "based upon [rule] 803 it is assumed that there 
will at least be an individual there to testify to the accuracy and correctness of the 
documents,"" the court noted defendant "fail[ed] to cite any authority to support his 
position" or "offer further insight into how he would prefer to see foundation 
...established," finally "find[ing] that the affidavits [certificates] are ... self-
authenticating documents under Federal Rule of Evidence 902(4)." Id. at 268. 
A public record does not require a custodian of records to lay foundation whereas a 
business record does. Utah R. Evid. 803(6), (8). Thus, if this Court clarifies that 
calibration certificates are self-authenticating documents whose foundational threshold 
for admissibility is equivalent to that of public records, it can halt practices such as was 
attempted in Wilkinson - and in this appeal - and thus help "secure simplicity in 
procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of unnecessary expense and 
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delay." Utah R. Crim. Pro. 1. Since Wilkinson is not binding on Utah courts, were this 
Court to not clarify this issue, the current efforts to subpoena technicians for repetitive 
testimony on foundational issues would be replaced with efforts to subpoena some person 
in the capacity of a business record custodian from the UHP to lay needless foundation, as 
defense counsel's efforts in Wilkinson demonstrate. 
A second reason sound judicial policy supports holding calibration certificates are 
self-authenticating documents is the proliferation of justice courts. DUIs are prosecuted 
primarily as class B misdemeanors, unless there is an enhancing factor like "child 
present" in the instant appeal. Jurisdiction for class B misdemeanors is injustice court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-104 (1997). Justice courts are courts not of record. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-5-101 (1999). While de novo appeal from justice court to district court is a 
simple matter, appeal from district court is limited to where "the district court rules on the 
constitutionality of a statute of a statute or ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (7) 
(2001). This has resulted in a paucity of case law relating to DUIs in Utah and thus 
clarifying law is needed for practitioners. 
Under the analysis thus far, in addition to holding calibration certificates are 
nontestimonial and thus admissible regardless whether the technician is available, this 
Court should hold calibration certificates are self-authenticating documents whose 
foundational threshold for admissibility is equivalent to that of public records, i.e., 
without foundational testimony. 
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D, Even under Murray City v. Hall calibration certificates are self-
authenticating documents which do not require the presence of a 
foundational witness prior to admission. 
Appellant argues "that the state [city] cannot use a substitute witness" in place of 
the missing technician. Br. of App. p. 22. That assumes the city is required to produce a 
technician at trial for admission of the certificates, or at least that one be available. In the 
same vein, appellant argues that under Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1319-21 
(Utah 1983), he is entitled to subpoena the technician but since the technician was 
unavailable out of the country when this case was set for trial, the city may not use the 
calibration certificates in his absence. Br. of App. pp. 8-9. If the city made an argument 
for a substitute technician/witness in the trial court, and that is unclear, the city hereby 
abandons that point on appeal. Even under Hall the city may introduce the foundational 
calibration certificates without the technician. 
1. The holding in Hall. 
In Hall, decided prior to Crawford, the Utah Supreme Court upheld § 41-6-44.3 
(now § 41-6a-515) when it was challenged on confrontation clause grounds, holding "so 
long as there is .. .contemporaneous preparation [of the certificates] in accordance with 
established standards, in the regular course of the officer's duties, and indications of 
trustworthiness" the calibration certificates are "admissible under § 41-6-44.3 [now § 41-
6a-515] as a valid statutory exception to the hearsay rule." Id. at 1321. The "right of 
confrontation is not absolute. In certain instances it must yield to legitimate government 
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interests." IdL "The enactment of § 41-6-44.3 manifests an intent by the Legislature to 
relieve the State of Utah and other governmental entities of the financial burden and 
inconvenience of calling as a witness in every DUI case the public officer responsible for 
testing...." Id at 1322. 
To that point in its holding and policy reasoning, Hall is consistent with both pre-
Crawford and post-Crawford cases. See e.g., State v. Huggins, 659 P.2d 613, 616 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (pre-Crawford: "To interrupt public business by requiring the 
personal testimony of each officer involved in compiling a particular breathalyzer packet 
would appear to serve no useful purpose5'); Jarrell, 852 N.E. 2d 1022, 1028 (post-
Crawford: "our supreme court has concluded that our legislature properly fashioned an 
inspection and certification scheme to insure the reliability of test results, thereby 
protecting the rights of the accused, while at the same time streamlining the trial 
process/5) 
The universal acceptance and reliability of modem breath testing technology is 
implicit in state statutory schemes nation-wide allowing admission of calibration 
certificates as self-authenticating documents without foundational testimony from their 
preparer. Indeed, thirty years ago one court suggested the universal acceptance and 
reliability of breath testing instruments had risen nearly to the level of blood pressure 
readings and electrocardiograms. People v. Gower, 42 N.Y.2d 117 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977); 
see also, Roosevelt City Corp. v. Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
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("[Section 41-6-443 now § 41-6a-515] is a legislative recognition of the universal 
acceptance of the reliability of such evidence."); citing HalL 663 P.2d at 1320 
2. Hall's dicta 
Appellant argues Hall's holding is conditioned on the technician's availability: "In 
fact, if an accused feels that the machine was not functioning properly or wants to prove 
non-compliance with the [calibration] standards established ... he/she can subpoena the 
public safety officer for testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer .... The appellant 
apparently chose not to do so." HalL 663 P.2d at 1322 (emphasis added). Appellant 
notes that in the instant case the technician was not just "unavailable" in that he was not 
subpoenaed, but "unavailable" in that he was out of the country and could not be 
subpoenaed even if appellant attempted to. Br. of App. p. 4; R. 42. 
Appellant argues that language conditions Hall's holding on factual availability 
that was not taken advantage of, and therefore Hall is inapplicable here. Br. of App. p. 8. 
To read Hall in that manner is to say Hall stands for the proposition that § 41-6-44.3 
(now § 41-6a-515) does not violate confrontation rights because it allows a defendant to 
exercise confrontation rights - if they want to by simply issuing a subpoena. That 
argument is unpersuasive on its own logic and for the following reasons. 
3. Hall's dicta is inconsistent with the legislative intent of § 41-6-44.3 
which was to relieve technicians from needlessly appearing in court, 
not to leave them open to subpoena by the defense in every DUI case. 
Hall's dicta is inconsistent with the legislative intent of § 41-6-44.3 (now § 41-6a-
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515) which was to relieve technicians from needlessly appearing in court not to leave 
them open to subpoena by the defense in every DUI case. The legislative history states 
the purpose of that section was to avoid requiring technicians to appear in court to give 
foundation testimony: 
The Utah Highway Patrol provides a technician to appear in court and to certify 
the breath test instrument used. In some instances these officers may explain the 
tests they perform on the instruments several times to the same judge on the same 
day. This bill requires the Commissioner of Public Safety to establish standards 
for administration and interpretation of the breath test results. This bill quotes, 
almost verbatim, the exception to the hearsay rule and also creates a presumption 
that the test result is valid without further foundation when done in a specified 
manner. 
1979 UTAH S. J. 43RD LEGIS. GEN. SESS. NO. 1, at 713-14. 
Thus, § 41-6-44.3 was not enacted to merely shift whose office - the prosecutor's 
or defense counsel's - issues the subpoena. The intent was systemic relief by simplifying 
procedure, eliminating unnecessary expense and avoiding delay. Section 41-6-44.3 (now 
41-6a-515) simplifies trials by not having foundational testimony about what went into 
producing the calibration certificates elicited in every DUI; it eliminates the expense of 
subpoenaing technicians and the expense of having personnel cover their duties while at 
trial; and it avoids delay by use of tactics like 'show up drills' - which the court avoided 
in Wilkinson - wherein valueless foundation witnesses are subpoenaed, which only has 
the effect of necessitating witness coordination with the prospect of little or no utility 
resulting from the sought for cross examination. Also, under appellant's reasoning, in 
circumstances where two separate technicians perform calibration maintenance checks -
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one technician before a defendant's arrest date and a second technician after the arrest 
date - appellant would be arguing to cross examine both technicians, thus further 
consuming time and resources and extending the length of trials. Norman itself spoke of 
technicians in the plural. Norman, 125 P.2d at 19. In the section immediately below the 
city attempts to demonstrate appellant's questions have little prospect of being useful 
cross examination. 
The legislative intent in Utah and other states with statutes similar to § 41-6a-515 
was to streamline trial process where universally accepted breath testing technology is 
used and its accuracy can be assured with certificates and specifically contemplates that a 
DUI in which there is breath test evidence shall be prosecuted without the technician, 
period "[S]o long as there is...contemporaneous preparation [of the certificates] in 
accordance with established standards, in the regular course of the officer's duties, and 
indications of trustworthiness...." Hall, 663 P.2d at 1321. That finding is for the trial 
court to make, not the jury. This appeal and Wilkinson demonstrate how far afield from 
the legislative intent DUI practice may deviate. 
Under the foregoing discussion this Court should not be persuaded that Hall's 
holding is conditioned on a technician's factual availability. 
4. Appellant's proposed questions for the technician demonstrate the 
utility of cross examination would be minimal or remote. 
Appellant's proposed questions for the technician demonstrate the utility of cross 
examination would be minimal or remote. The questions about the simulator solution 
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and other matters are not only so remote from the accusatory actual evidence - meaning 
the test result card itself as opposed to the foundational calibration certificates - they are 
already answered in the certificate. 
Appellant's brief, at p. 19, reads: ".. .the trooper must make sure the air pump 
works and also run the air pump for twelve to fifteen seconds, [and then asks] How long 
the trooper waited." Id, He already answered that when he checked "yes" to box number 
three (3). Appellant also asks about the simulator solution used during calibration 
procedures. That was answered when the technician checked "yes" to box numbers seven 
(7) and nine (9). 
Since there is no suggestion the technician would testify he or she really did not do 
what the certificate indicates there is no reason for his or her appearance. See, State v. 
Godshalk, 381 NJ . Super. 326, 332-33 ("there is no basis for conceiving that a State 
Police Inspector would violate his duty and certify that a breathalyzer was functioning 
properly when the truth was to the contrary"). Similarly there is no reason to believe the 
technician was distracted by errant officers moving about in the room where the 
intoxilyzer is kept during calibration procedures. Br. of App. p. 19. 
Thus, there is no utility at law to subpoena the technician to a DUI trial or even an 
evidentiary hearing. "To the extent [appellant's] complaint really is that he [will not be] 
able to cross-examine the preparer of the [intoxilyzer] certificate regarding the 
maintenance and certification process, he simply is restating his Crawford objection under 
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a slightly different guise." Jarrell 852 N.E.2d. 1022, 1027. The only possible utility 
would be to go beyond the certificate's contents and into questions about the intoxilyzer's 
underlying technology, as Jarrell recognized. 
Such efforts run counter to the legislative intent to avoid forcing "officers [to] 
explain the tests they perform on the instruments...." and to the universal acceptance of 
breath testing technology and systematized calibration procedures. 1979 UTAH S. J. 43RD 
LEGIS. GEN. SESS. NO. 1, at 713-14; Roosevelt City Corp. v. Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738, 740 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[Section 41-6-44.3] is a legislative recognition of the universal 
acceptance of the reliability of such evidence.") 
5. The city is not arguing for an absolute bar to cross examining the 
technician - it is appropriate in limited circumstances. 
The city is not arguing for an absolute bar to cross examining the technician - it is 
appropriate in limited circumstances. But Hall's language could give the impression the 
defense is permitted to subpoena the technician when he or she "feels" the machine was 
not functioning properly or "wants" to prove the technician did not comply with the 
applicable administrative standards. Hall, 663 P.2d at 1322. That is not what Hall meant. 
At law, motions and actions like subpoenaing a person or requesting a hearing 
must be founded upon some basis in law or fact: "A motion shall state succinctly and with 
particularity the grounds upon which it is made and the relief sought." Utah R. Crim. P. 
12(a). 
One post-Crawford calibration certificate case addressing whether there must be 
40 
merit to subpoenaing the technician is State v. Carter, 114 P.3d 1001 (Mont. 2005), which 
found no trial court error in admitting "certification reports, despite that fact that the 
authors of the report were not present to testify and be confronted." Id at 1007. 
Importantly, the court then stated that if defendant's pretrial investigation reveals some 
error in the certificates or that they are otherwise subject to attack, it is then and only then 
that defendant may subpoena the technician: 
That is not to say, however, that the authors of these certification reports may 
never be called to testify in person. If, in a given case, the defendant's pretrial 
investigation reveals that the reports are in error or are otherwise subject to attacks 
the defendant is always free to subpoena the authors for purposes of testifying at a 
hearing on a timely filed motion to suppress evidence or at trial for impeachment 
purposes. 
Id. at 1007 (emphasis added); see also, State v. Huggins, 659 P.2d 613 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1982) (pre-Crawford: "in the absence of some specific evidence in a specific case that a 
specific record fisl inaccurate" it "would serve no useful purpose" ... "to interrupt public 
business by requiring the personal testimony of each officer involved in compiling a 
particular breathalyzer packet") (emphasis added). 
In light of the above logical argument, clear legislative intent, and Carter and 
Huggins, this Court should hold that calibration certificates are self-authenticating 
documents and that in the absence of some specific defect within its four corners that a 
calibration certificate is inaccurate, a DUI defendant is not permitted to subpoena the 
technician. This court should further hold that where the defense can point to some 
specific evidence in a specific case that a certificate is inaccurate, the hearing held is one 
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to determine the admissibility of the calibration certificates, which is a question for the 
court not the jury. Utah R. Evid. 104(a) ("the admissibility of evidence shall be 
determined by the court"); see Carter, 114 P.3d at 1007. 
Such a hearing may be warranted in circumstances where the calibration certificate 
is illegible, the serial numbers did not match, the notation lines contain an illegible entry 
(rather than a clear statement "no repairs" in the instant case), or where a box was not 
checked or it was checked "no" then erased and checked "yes," or some other possible 
aspect that could raise the possibility of inaccuracy. But here, where the calibration 
certificates are filled out perfectly, there is no basis at law to subpoena the technician to 
an evidentiary hearing, let alone have them cross examined before a jury on a 
foundational question of admissibility. 
6. Even assuming appellant's reading of Hall is correct, that case has been 
overruled by Crawford, 
Even assuming appellant's reading of Hall is correct, to the extent Hall is 
inconsistent with Crawford, it is no longer valid law. The city has supplied 
overwhelming post-Crawford case law holding that calibration certificates showing 
compliance with applicable administrative rules are admissible without violating a DUI 
arrestee's confrontation rights, regardless of technician availability. The only conceivable 
post-Crawford circumstance under which subpoenaing the technician would be warranted 
is that suggested by Carter and Huggins above. But in this appeal, where the calibration 
certificates are filled out properly and appellant's proposed questions are answered in the 
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certificate, there can be no valid reason at law reason to require the technician's presence. 
Hall was decided on federal constitutional grounds as was Crawford, and 
appellant's arguments regarding Hall raise no separate state constitutional analysis. Br. of 
App. pp. 8-10. Appellant may not therefore assert a separate state constitutional analysis 
in a reply brief when he did not do so in his merits brief. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 
854 n. 1 (Utah 1992) (rejecting state constitutional argument raised for first time in reply 
brief). 
CONCLUSION 
While the authorities above are not binding on this Court, based on the points and 
authorities discussed above this Court should hold calibration certificates are 
nontestimonial hearsay and thus their introduction into evidence without the technician's 
presence at trial, and the statute enabling their introduction into evidence, does not violate 
appellant's confrontation rights. As part of its holding this Court should hold calibration 
certificates are self-authenticating documents and that in the absence of some specific 
defect within their four corners indicating inaccuracy, a DUI defendant is not permitted to 
subpoena the technician. This court should further hold that where the defense can point 
to some specific defect in a certificate is inaccurate, the hearing held is one to determine 
the admissibility of the calibration certificates, which is a question for the court and not 
the jury. 
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rd Respectfully submitted this 23r day of April 2007. 
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41-6a-515. Standards for chemical breath or oral fluids analysis -
evidence 
(1) The commissioner of the department shall establish standards for the 
administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath or oral 
fluids, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person 
was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, 
conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made and the instrument 
used was accurate, according to standards established in Subsection (1), are 
admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the 
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the method and 
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under Subsection (1) and 
the conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that the 
test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the evidence is 
unnecessary. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 2, 2005 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 
Standards for chemical breath analysis - Evidence. 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall establish 
standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a 
person's breath, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person was 
operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions, or 
events to prove that the analysis was made and the instrument used was 
accurate, according to standards established in Subsection (1), are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the investigation 
at or about the time of the act, condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the method and 
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under Subsection (1) and the 
conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that the test 
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R714-500. Chemical Analysis Standards and Training. 
R714-500-1. Purpose. 
A. It is the purpose of this rule to set forth: 
(1) Procedures whereby the department may certify: 
(a) Breath alcohol testing instruments; 
(b) Breath alcohol testing programs; 
(c) Breath alcohol testing operators; 
(d) Breath alcohol testing technicians; and 
(e) Breath alcohol testing program supervisors. 
(2) Adjudicative procedure concerning: 
(a) Application for and denial, suspension or revocation of the aforementioned certifications; and 
(b) Appeal of initial department action concerning the aforementioned certifications. 
R714-500-2. Authority. 
A. This rule is authorized by Subsection 41-6-44.3(1) which requires the commissioner of the Department of Public 
Safety, hereinafter departments to establish standards for the administration and inteipretation of chemical analysis 
of a person's breath, including standards of training. 
R714-500-3. Application for Certification. 
A. Application for any certification herein shall be made on forms provided by the department in accordance with 
Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(c). 
R714-500-4. Instrument Certification. 
A. Acceptance: All breath alcohol testing instruments employed by Utah law enforcement officers, to be used for 
evidentiary purposes, shall be approved by the department. 
(1) The department shall maintain an approved list of accepted instruments for use in the state. Law enforcement en-
tities shall select breath alcohol instruments from this accepted list, which list shall be available for public inspection 
at the department during normal working hours 
(2) A manufacturer may make application for approval uf an instrument by brand and/or model not on the list The 
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department shall subsequently examine and evaluate each instrument to determine if it meets criteria specified, by 
this rule and applicable purchase requisitions. 
B. Criteria: In order to be approved, each manufacturer's brand and/or model of breath testing instrument shall meet 
the following criteria. 
(1) Breath alcohol analysis of an instrument shall be based on the principle of infra-red energy absorption, or any 
other similarly effective procedure specified by the department 
(2) Breath specimen collected for analysis shall be essentially alveolar and/or end expiratory in composition accord-
ing to the analysis method utilized. 
(3) The instrument shall analyze a reference sample, such as headspace gas from a mixture of water and a known 
weight or volume of ethanol, held at a constant temperature, or a compressed inert gas and alcohol mixture in a pres-
surized cylinder. The result of the analysis must agree with the reference sample's predicted value, within plus or 
minus 5%, or .005, whichever is greater, or such limits as set by the department For example, if a known reference 
sample is .10, a plus or minus range of 5%=.005 ( .10x5 %= .005). The test result, using a known .10 solution or 
compressed inert gas and alcohol solution, could range from .095-. 105. 
(4) The instrument shall provide an accurate and consistent analysis of breath specimen for the determination of al-
cohol concentration for law enforcement purposes. The instrument shall function within the manufacturer's specific-
ations of: 
(a) electrical power, 
(b) operating temperature, 
(c) internal purge, 
(d) internal calibration, 
(e) diagnostic measurements, 
(f) invalid test procedures, 
(g) known reference sample testing, 
(h) measurements of breath alcohol, as displayed in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(5) Any other tests, deemed necessary by the department, may be required in order to correctly and adequately eval-
uate the instrument, to give the most accurate and correct results in routine breath alcohol testing and be practical 
and reliable for law enforcement purposes. 
C. List: Upon proof of compliance with this rule, an instrument may be approved by brand and/or model and placed 
on the list of accepted instruments. By inclusion on the department's list of accepted instruments, it will be deemed 
to have met the criteria listed above. 
D. Certification: All breath alcohol instruments purchased for law enforcement evidentiary purposes, shall be certi-
fied before being placed into service. 
(1) The breath alcohol testing program supervisor, hereinafter, "program supervisor", shall determine if each indi-
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vidual instrument, by serial number, conforms to the brand and/or model that appears on the commissioner's accep-
ted list. 
(2) Once an individual instrument has been purchased* found to be operating correctly and placed into service the 
affidavit with the serial number of that instrument, shall be placed in a file for certified instruments. Affidavits veri-
fying the certification of any breath testing instrument shall be available during normal business hours through the 
Department of Public Safety, more specifically the Utah Highway Patrol Training Section, 5681 S. 320 West, Mur-
ray, UT 84107. 
(3) The department may, at any time, determine if a specific instrument is unreliable and/or unserviceable. Pending 
such a finding, an instrument may be removed from service and certification may be withdrawn. 
(4) Only certified breath alcohol testing technicians, hereinafter "technicians*, as defined by Section 7 of this rule 
when required, shall be authorized to provide expert testimony concerning the certification and all other aspects o f 
the breath testing instrument under his/her supervision. 
R714-500-5. Program Certification. 
A. All breath alcohol testing techniques, methods, and programs, hereinafter "program", must be certified by the de-
partment. 
B. Prior to initiating a program, an agency or laboratory shall submit an application to the department for certifica-
tion. The application shall show the brand and/or model of the instrument to be used and contain a resume of the 
program to be followed. An on-site inspection shall be made by the department to determine compliance with all ap-
plicable provisions in this rule. 
C. Certification of a program may be denied, suspended, or revoked by the department if, based on information ob-
tained by the department, program supervisor, or technician, the agency or laboratory fails to meet the criteria as 
outlined by the department. 
D. All programs, in order to be certified, shall meet the following criteria: 
(1) The results of tests to determine the concentration of alcohol on a person's breath shall be expressed as equival-
ent grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. The results of such tests shall be entered in a permanent record book 
for department use. 
(2) Printed checklists, outlining the method of properly performing breath tests shall be available at each location 
where tests are given. Test record cards used in conjunction with breath testing shall be available at each location 
where tests are given. Both the checklist and test record card, after completion of a test should be retained by the op-
erator. 
(3) The instruments shall be certified on a routine basis, not to exceed 40 days between calibration tests, by a techni-
cian, depending on location of instruments and area of responsibility. 
(4) Certification procedures to certify the breath testing instrument shall be performed by a technician as required in 
this rule, or by using such procedures as recommended by the manufacturer of the instrument to meet its perform-
ance specifications, as derived from: 
(a) electrical power tests, 
(b) operating temperature tests, 
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(c) internal purge tests, 
(d) internal calibration tests, 
(e) diagnostic tests, 
(f) invalid function tests, 
(g) known reference samples testing, and 
(h) measurements displayed in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(5) Results of tests for certification shall be kept in a permanent record book retained by the technician. A report o f 
the certification procedure shall be recorded on the approved form (affidavit) and sent to the program supervisor. 
(6) Except as set forth in paragraph 7 in this section, all analytical results on a subject test shall be recorded, using 
terminology established by state statute and reported to three decimal places. For example, a result of 0.237g/210L 
shall be reported as 0.237. 
(7) Internal standards on a subject test do not have to be recorded numerically. 
(8) The instrument must be operated by either a certified operator or technician. 
R714-500-6. Operator Certification. 
A. All breath alcohol testing operators, hereinafter "operators*, must be certified by the department 
B. All training for initial and renewal certification will be conducted by a program supervisor and/or technician. 
C. Initial Certification 
(1) In order to apply for certification as an operator of a breath testing instrument, an applicant must successfully 
complete a course of instruction approved by the department, which must include as a minimum the following: 
a. One hour of instruction on the effects of alcohol in the human body. 
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath testing. 
c. One hour of instruction on the D.U.I. Summons and Citation/D.U.I. Report Form. 
d. One and one half hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical testing, driving under the influence case 
law and other alcohol related laws. 
e. One and one half hours of laboratory participation performing simulated tests on the instruments, including 
demonstrations under the supervision of a class instructor. 
f. One hour for examination and critique of course. 
(2) After successful completion of the initial certification course a certificate will be issued that will be valid for two 
years. 
D. Renewal Certification 
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(1) The operator is required to renew certification prior to its expiration date. The minimum requirement for renewal 
of operator certification will be: 
a. Two hours of instruction on the effects of alcohol in the human body. 
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath testing. 
c. One hour of instruction on the D.U.I. Summons and Citation/D.U.L Report Form and testimony of arresting of-
ficer. 
d. Two hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical testing and detecting the drinking driver. 
e. One hour for examination and critique of course. 
f. Or the operator must successfully complete the Compact Disc Computer program including successful completion 
of exam. Results of exams must be forwarded to program supervisor and a certification certificate will be issued. 
(2) Any operator who allows his/her certification to expire one year or longer must retake and successfully complete 
the initial certification course as outlined in paragraph C of this section. 
R714-500-7. Technician Certification. 
A. All technicians, must be certified by the department. 
B. The minimum qualifications for certification as a technician are: 
(1) Satisfactory completion of the operator's initial certification course and/or renewal certification course. 
(2) Satisfactory completion of the Breath Alcohol Testing Supervisor's course offered by Indiana University, or an 
equivalent course of instruction, as approved by the program supervisor. 
(3) Satisfactory completion of the manufacturer's maintenance/repair technician course. 
(4) Maintain technician's status through a minimum of eight hours training each calendar year. This training must be 
directly related to the breath alcohol testing program, and must be approved by the program supervisor. 
C. Any technician who fails to meet the requirements of paragraph B, sub-paragraph (4) of this section and allows 
his/her certification to expire for more than one year, must renew his/her certification by meeting the minimum re-
quirements as outlined in paragraph B, sub-paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this section. 
R714-500-8. Program Supervisor Certification. 
A. The program supervisor will be required to meet the minimum certification standards set forth in section 7 of this 
rule. Certification should be within one year after initial appointment or other time as stated by the department. 
R714-500-9. Previously Certified Personnel. 
A. This rule shall not be construed as invalidating the certification of personnel previously certified as operators un-
der programs existing prior to the promulgation of this rule. Such personnel shall be deemed certified, provided they 
meet the training requirements as outlined in section 6, paragraph D of this rule. 
B. This rule shall not be construed as invalidating the certification of personnel previously certified as a technician 
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under programs existing prior to the promulgation of this rule. Such personnel shall be deemed certified, provided 
they meet the training requirements in section 77 paragraph B, sub-paragraph (4) of this rule. 
R714-5G0-10. Revocation or Suspension of Certification, 
A. The department may, on the recommendation of the program supervisor, revoke or suspend the certification o f 
any operator or technician: 
(1) Who fails to comply with or meet any of the criteria required in this rule. 
(2) Who falsely or deceitfully obtained certification. 
(3) Who fails to show proficiency in proper operation of the breath testing instrument 
(4) For other good cause. 
R714-500-11. Adjudicative Proceedings. 
A. Purpose of section. It is the purpose of this section to set forth adjudicative proceedings in compliance with Title 
63 Chapter 46b. 
B. Designation. All adjudicative proceedings performed by the department shall proceed informally as set forth 
herein and as authorized by Sections 63- 46b-4 and 63-46b-5. 
C. Denial, suspension or revocation. A party who is denied certification or whose certification is suspended or re-
voked, will be informed within a period of 30 days by the department the reasons for denial, suspension, or revoca-
tion. 
D. Appeal of denial, suspension, or revocation. A party who is denied certification or whose certification is suspen-
ded or revoked may appeal to the commissioner or designee on a form provided by the department in accordance 
with Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(c). The appeal must be filed within ten days after receiving notice of the department 
action. 
E. No hearing will be granted to the party. The commissioner or designee will merely review the appeal and issue a 
written decision to the party within ten days after receiving the appeal. 
KEY: alcohol, intoxilyzer, breath testing, operator certification 
October 3, 2002 
Notice of Continuation May 12, 2005 
41-6-44.3 
63-46b 
UT ADC R714-500 
END OF DOCUMENT 
U.S. Constitution: Sixth Amendment 
Sixth Amendment - Rights of Accused in Criminal Prosecutions 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence, Rule 102. Purpose and construction. 
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, 
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of 
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the 
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. 
Utah Rule of Evidence, Rule 104. Preliminary questions. 
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions 
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence 
of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by 
the court, subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b). In making its 
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those 
with respect to privileges. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 (2005) 
(5) As a matter of procedure, a peace officer shall send to the division 
within ten calendar days after the day on which notice is provided: 
(a) the person's license certificate; 
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense; 
(c) a signed report in a manner specified by the division indicating 
the chemical test results, if any; and 
(d) any other basis for the peace officer's determination that the 
person has violated Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517. 
Utah Rule of Evidence, Rule 802. Hearsay rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these 
rules. 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant 
immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness: 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, 
opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from 
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the 
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the 
regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, 
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of 
the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that 
complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting 
certification, unless the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The 
term "business"^ as used in this paragraph includes business, 
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every 
kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data 
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth 
(A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed 
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty 
to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by 
police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil 
actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal 
cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant 
to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
Rule 902. Self-authentication 
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to 
admissibility is not required with respect to the following: 
(2) Domestic public documents not under seal. A document 
purporting to bear the signature in the official capacity of an officer or 
employee of any entity included in Paragraph (1) hereof, having no 
seal, if a public officer having a seal and having official duties in the 
district or political subdivision of the officer or employee certifies 
under seal that the signer has the official capacity and that the 
signature is genuine. 
(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official record or 
report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be 
recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office, 
including data compilations in any form, certified as correct by the 
custodian or other person authorized to make the certification, by 
certificate complying with Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this rule or 
complying with any law of the United States or of this state. 
(8) Acknowledged documents. Documents accompanied by a 
certificate of acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by 
law by a notary public or other officer authorized by law to take 
acknowledgments. 
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of 
authentication or identification provided by court rule, statute, or as 
provided in the constitution of this state. 
(11) Certified domestic records of regularly conducted activity - The 
original or a duplicate of a domestic record of regularly conducted 
activity that would be admissible under Rule 803(6) if accompanied 
by an affidavit or a written declaration of its custodian or other 
qualified person, certifying that: 
(A) the record was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the 
matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge of those matters; 
(B) the record was kept in the course of the regularly conducted 
activity; 
(C) the record was made by the regularly conducted activity as a 
regular practice; and 
(D) the person certifying the records does so under penalty of making 
a false statement in an official proceeding. 
The affidavit or declaration must be signed in a manner that, if falsely 
made, would subject the maker to criminal penalty under the laws 
where the declaration is signed. A party intending to offer a record 
into evidence under this paragraph must provide written notice of that 
intention to all adverse parties, and must make the record and 
certification available for inspection sufficiently in advance of their 
offer into evidence to provide an adverse party with a fair opportunity 
to challenge them. 
Advisory Committee Note B The amendment to Rule 803(6) and the 
addition of Rules 902(11) and 902(12) were made to track the 
changes made to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) and the adoption 
of Federal Rules 902(11) and 902(12), effective December 1, 2000. 
The changes to the federal rules benefit from a federal statute 
allowing the use of declarations without notarization. Utah has no 
comparable statute, so the requirements for declarations used under 
the rule are included within the rule itself. 
R708-14-8- Hearing Procedures. 
(1) Time and place. Alcohol/drug adjudicative pro-
! ceedings will be held in the county of arrest, at a time 
and place designated by the division, or agreed upon 
by the parties. 
£2) ffotice. Notice shall be given as provided in 
by the parties. Notice shall be given on a form ap-
proved by the division and is deemed to be signed by 
the presiding officer. The notice need only inform the 
parties as to the date, time, place, and basic purpose of 
ifae proceeding. The parties are deemed to have 
knowledge of the law. 
(3) Default. If the driver fails to respond timely to a 
division request or notice, a default may be entered in 
accordance with Section 63-46b-ll. 
(4) Evidence. Hie parties and witnesses may testify 
under oath, present evidence, and comment on perti-
nent issues, The presiding officer may exclude irrele-
vant, repetitious, immaterial, or privileged informa-
tion or evidence. The presiding officer may consider 
hearsay evidence and receive documentary evidence, 
including copies or excerpts. 
(5) Information. The driver shall have access to 
information in the division file to the extent permitted 
by law. 
(6) Subpoenas. Discovery is prohibited, but the 
division may issue subpoenas or other orders to com-
pel production of necessary evidence. Subpoenas may 
be issued by the division at the request of the driver if 
the costs of the subpoenas are paid by the driver and 
will not delay the proceeding. 
(7) Administrative notice. The presiding officer has 
discretion to take administrative notice of records, 
procedures, rules, policies, technical scientific facts 
within the presiding officer's specialized knowledge or 
experience, or of any other facts that could be judi-
cially noticed. 
(8) Presiding officer. The presiding officer may: 
(a) administer oaths; 
(b) issue subpoenas; 
(c) conduct prehearing conferences by telephone or 
in person to clarify issues, dispose of procedural 
questions, and expedite the hearing; 
78-5-101. Crea t ion of justice cou r t — Not of 
record. 
Under Article VIII, Section 1, Utah Constitution, 
there is created a court not of record known as the 
justice court. The judges of this court are justice court 
judges.
 m 9 
78-5-104. Jurisdiction. 
(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and 
C misdemeanors, violation of ordinances, and infrac-
tions committed within their territorial jurisdiction, 
except those offenses over which the juvenile court 
has exclusive jurisdiction. 
(2) Justice courts have jurisdiction of small claims 
cases under Title 78, Chapter 6, Small Claims Courts, 
if the defendant resides in or the debt arose within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the justice court. 1997 
78-5-120. Appeals from justice court — Trial or 
hearing' de novo in district court. 
(1) In a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to a 
trial de novo in the district court only if the defendant 
files a notice of appeal within 30 days of: 
(a) sentencing after a bench or jury trial, or a 
plea of guilty in the justice court resulting in
 a 
finding or verdict of guilt; or 
(b) a plea of guilty in the justice court that is 
held in abeyance. 
(2) If an appeal under Subsection (1) is of a plea 
entered pursuant to negotiation with the prosecutor, 
and the defendant did not reserve the right to appeal 
as part of the plea negotiation, the negotiation is 
voided by the appeal. 
(3) A defendant convicted and sentenced in justice 
court is entitled to a hearing de novo in the district 
court on the following matters, if he files a notice of 
appeal within 30 days of: 
(a) an order rfevoking probation; 
(b) an order entering a judgment of guilt pur-
suant to the person's failure to fulfil the terms of 
a plea in abeyance agreement; 
(c) a sentence entered pursuant to Subsection 
(3)(b); or 
(d) an order denying a motion to withdraw a 
plea. 
(4) The prosecutor is entitled to a hearing de novo 
in the district court on: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution be-
cause of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of a 
speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment holding invalid any part of a 
statute or ordinance; 
(e) a pretrial order excluding evidence, when 
the prosecutor certifies that exclusion of that 
evidence prevents continued prosecution; or 
(f) an order granting a motion to withdraw a 
plea of guilty or no contest. 
(5) Upon entering a decision in a hearing de novo, 
the district court shall remand the case to the justice 
court unless: 
(a) the decision results in immediate dismissal 
of the case; 
(b) with agreement of the parties, the district 
court consents to retain jurisdiction; or 
(c) the defendant enters a plea of guilty in the 
district court. 
(6) The district court shall retain jurisdiction over 
the case on trial de novo. 
(7) The decision of the district court is final and 
may not be appealed unless the district court rules on 
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Department of Public Safety 
ROBERT L FLOWERS 
Commissioner 
State of Utah 
ON M HUNTSMAN JR 
Governor 
GARY R HERBERT 
Lieutenant Governor 
CUSTODIAN CERTIFICATE 
I, the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that: 
1 I am the Breathtesting Supervisor of the Utah Highway Patrol and the official keeper of and 
responsible for the maintenance check records of the breathtesting instruments maintained in 
State of Utah. 
2. Attached are true and correct copies of the records of maintenance and certification for the 
Intoxilyzer serial numberffi~~£&235(p located at ^ S L d P D V'lcs^OiAs-
of which are kept on file by me, in the course of official business, for the State of Utah, 
Department of Public Safety and in accordance with the current regulations of the Commissio 
of Public Safety. 
3. The attached tests were done BEFORE and AFTER the date of 
Mavdk 51 ,2W? -
4. The breathtest technicians) whose signature(s) appear on the attached affidavit(s) are certified 
the State of Utah and has/have met all of the following requirements as required by the 
Department of Public Safety: 
a. Satisfactory completion of operator's initial certification course and/or renewal course; 
b. Satisfactory completion of the Breath Alcohol Testing Supervisor's course offered by tl 
Indiana University, or an equivalent course of instruction, as approved by the Breath 
Alcohol Testing Program; 
c. Satisfactory completion of a Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument Manufacturer's 
Maintenance/Repair Technician course for the instruments in use in the State of Utah or 
is qualified by nature of his/her employment or training to maintain/repair those 
instruments; 
d. Maintain Technician's status through a minimum of eight (8) hours related training each 
calendar year. 
5 I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matter alleged in this affidavit 
NOTARY Hl'iLIC 
PAUL KOTTER 
5681 South 320 West 
Murray. Utah 84107 
My Commission Expires 
April 21, 2007 
STATE OF UTAH 
/4-J^<y\ l/^MsHjTtk-AAL 
iTATE OF UTAH 
*OUNTY OF ^ S U 
N THE LLV*~ DAY OF ay. 
WWARD WHO BEING DULY SWQ 
Sergeant Steven Winward 
Breathtesting Supervisor 
Utah Highway Patrol 
) 5 , PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE ME, STEVEN 
TECUTED THE ABOVE REFERENCED CERTIFICATE AND I BEFORE 
\RTIFY~THAT SAID PERSON IS AN OFFICER AND~EMPLOYEE OF THE DEPARTMENT 67PUBLfc*SAFETT O T T H E 
kTE OF UTAH AND IS THE LEGAL CUSTODIAN OF THE INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVITS OF SAID DEPARTMENT ANC 
\ l HIS SIGNATURE AFFIXED HERETO IS GENUINE 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
~ 
m Development and Technology Center, 5681 South 120 West Salt Lake Qtv UT 84107 i i PLA!NTIF£SS ' :i!SJEXH!BI] "*" Utnhl 
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Utah Department of Public Safsty 
Ceirincate of Calibration; 
Intoxilyzer 5000 / 8000 
We the undersigne4 being first duly sworn, state than 







 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ _ w a s p T o p ^ c h c - e i 
mrme/us m ihe course of official dunes, on., '"?7osrA q/.2£*:>r~a /O&i^ 
Last prior check of this instrument was done on / ^ / ^ ;?<.->^r-
2. This tvas done by a currently certified technician and according ro the standards 
•established by the Commissioner ofihe Utah Department of Public Safctv 
• > . This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were made a the time * f ™ 
tests were done. ^ ^ ^ 5 w 
4. I am/We are competent to testify and haw personal knowledge of the matters d W . * ^ 






THE FOLLOWING TESTS WS3SK MAINE: 
Electrical Power Check? 
(Red power switch OIL Displays "Not Ready") 
Temperature Check: 
(Displays cePusb button to start test", etc) 
Internal Puree Check: 
(Air pump works, runs for approximately 12 to 15 seconds.) 
Internal CaKbration Check: 
(Internal standards within factory specifications) 
Invalid Test: 
(Push the green start test button while the iuslm merit is in test mode.) 
Diagnostic Check: 
(Prom check, Ram check, Temperature check, Processor check; Printer check) 
Checked with Known Sample: 
(Simulator, 3 tests within + or - .005 or 5% whichever is greatest) 
Gives Headings in: 
(Grams'of Alcohol /210 Liters ofBreath) 
The Simulator Solution: 
(Was of the correct kind and properiy compounded) 
The Results of This Test Show: 
(Thai the instrument is weeiting properiy) 




5881 South 320 West 
Murray, Utah B4107 
My Commission Expires 
May 5. 2007 
STATE OF UTAH 
CEjpiTEZ) 3SEATH TEST TECHNICIANS 
I/We op. oath, statethe foregoing is true. ~ 
(NOTARY SEAL) 
Subscribed and sworn before me this ^ ^ l a y of //\**JU^ 
(Day) i ^ ^ ^ , ^ ^ 
, , / / (EILAINTIFFS^ 
~7 
(Year) 
BiACrcant sw IQrtM 
(This page is intentionally left blank.) 
Utah Department of Public Safety 
Certificate of Calibration 
Lnioxilyzer 5000 / 8000 
I, We the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that 
1. TQXILYZS3L serial number. &&0-23ZA 








Breath testing mstrumenc T^ Ti 
iocsrecL 9x *-s^ ' * *r , ^
 r . _— ^  rTh.w *^wj^ «**j wuuuawu 
byme/us m die course of official dudes, QnJ^S///(J7 Zt&^tr a s&s^ 
Last prior check of this instrument was done vn.i&c^^ 2/ SJ>^>j^ 
This was done by a currently certified technician 2nd according ro the standards 
cstabhsfied by the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety. 
This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were made ar the time these 
tests were done. 
I am/We are competent to testify and have personal kmrwledge of the matters alleged in 
this ceroncaie, 
T S E FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MABE: 
2- Electrical Power Check: 
(Red power switch OIL Displays "Not Ready") 
2, Temperature Check: 
(Displays Tush button to start testf \ etc) 
Internal Purge Check: 
{Air pump "woncs, runs for approximately 12 to 15 seconds.) 
Internal Calibration Check: 
(Internal standards within factory specifications) 
Invalid Tesii 
(Push the green start test button while the instrument is in test mode.) 
Diagnostic Check: 
(Prom check, Ram check, Temperature check, Processor check. Printer check; 
Checked with Known Sample: 
(Simulator, 3 tests within + or - 005 or 5% whichever is greatest) 
Gives Readings in: 
(Grams of Alcohol / 210 Liters of Breath) 
The Simulator Solution: 
(Was of the correct kind and properiy compounded) 
The ResnJts of This Test Show: 
(That the instrument is working properiy) 






5681 South 320 Wect 
Murrev, Utah 84107 
My Commission Expires 
April 21 2007 
STATE OF UTAH 
(NOTARY SEAL) 
C I T I F I E D SHEATH TEST TECHNICIANS 
/I/We,.on oaih. state,the foregoing is true. 
Subscribed and sworn before me this -fayof /$s?f/'/ 
(Day) <' rMnnrtT 
V '&*£ 
aiACTaim TB* in/rii 
(This page is intentionally left blank.) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 






Case No. 055900090 
Judge Robin W. Reese 
Date: June 7, 2 006 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion in Limine. 
Having considered the memoranda submitted by the parties,1 the Court 
enters the following decision and finds that Defendant's Motion should 
be DENIED. 
At issue here are two Certificates of Calibration of Intoxilyzer 
5000/8000 prepared by Trooper Byron Camacho. It is undisputed that 
Trooper Camacho is currently out of the country and is unavailable to 
testify that he performed the checks on the breath testing instrument at 
issue here. Therefore, the State would like to admit the 
Certificates/Affidavits completed by Trooper Camacho in lieu of his 
testimony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515. Section 41-6a-515 
provides: 
(1) The commissioner of the department shall establish 
standards for the administration and interpretation of 
chemical analysis of a person's breath or oral fluids, 
including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to 
prove that a person was operating or in actual physical 
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or 
records of acts, conditions, or events to prove that the 
analysis was made and the instrument used was accurate, 
according to standards established in Subsection (1) , are 
admissible if: 
1
 The Court would like to note that counsel for both the defense and for the City provided 
well-written and well-researched memoranda, significantly easing the Court's burden in reaching 
this decision. f \ 
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(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course 
of the investigation at or about the time of the act, 
condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the-method 
and circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under 
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been 
met, there is a presumption that the test results are valid 
and further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary. 
Defendant does not argue that the Certificates/Affidavits Trooper 
Camacho prepared do not comport with the requirements of § 41~6a-515.2 
Rather, Defendant asserts that Section 41-6a-515 and the admission of 
the Certifications violates the Confrontation Clause because Defendant 
will not be allowed to examine Trooper Camacho. 
At the outset, the Court notes that Murray City v. Hall, 663 P. 2d 
1314 (Utah 1983) appears to resolve this issue. In Hall, the court held 
that : 
given the (1) legitimate governmental interest in not having 
to produce in every DUI case the public officer responsible 
for testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer and the ampoules, 
and (2) the alternative means available to an accused to 
cross-examine and confront such a witness, we hold that § 41-
6-44.3 [the previous version of Section 41-6a-515] does not 
violate the appellant's constitutional right of confrontation 
when all of its requirements are met. 
Id. at 1322. However, Hall raises two problems which limit this Court's 
ability to rely on the decision. First, Hall specifically stated that 
if an accused wants to question the public officer responsible for 
testing the breathalyzer, the accused has the right to subpoena the 
officer. In the present case, Trooper Camacho"s unavailability means 
that Defendant cannot subpoena him. Second, Hall was decided prior to 
the seminal case of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 
158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) . Therefore, the Court must determine whether the 
affidavits can be admitted even though Defendant cannot call Camacho to 
*
 2
 Although no argument was raised on this point, the Court finds that the 
Certificates/Affidavits are in compliance with Section 41 -6a-515. 
^ £1 
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testify and whether Crawford overruled Hall. 
In Crawford, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "[testimonial 
statements of witnesses absent from trial [are admissible] only where 
the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine-. "--541-U. S . at 59.- This—overruled 
the previous test from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) which held 
that hearsay statements were admissible if they bore "adequate indicia 
of reliability." The court in Crawford found that "unpardonable vice" 
of the "reliability" test was that it admitted "core testimonial 
statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude." 541 
U.S. at 63 (emphasis in original). Crawford said that the Sixth 
Amendment intended to only admit those exceptions that existed at the 
time of its founding. Id. at 54. At that time " [m] ost of the hearsay 
exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial 
- for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a 
conspiracy." Id. at 56. 
It is undisputed in the present case that, while the declarant 
(Trooper Camacho) is unavailable, Defendant did not have the opportunity 
to cross examine him. Therefore, according to Crawford, Camacho's 
affidavits violate the Confrontation Clause if they are "testimonial." 
The Court is persuaded that Camacho's affidavits are non-
testimonial. Crawford specifically leaves "for another day any effort 
to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.'" Id. at 68. 
However, a number of jurisdictions have recently addressed this same 
issue and it appears that the majority of have found that Intoxilyzer 
certifications are not testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause. See, e.g., Bohsancurt v. Honorable Eisenberg, 129 P.3d 471 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); Rackoff v. State, 621 S.E.2d 841 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2005); Napier v. State, 827 N.E.2d 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); State v. 
Norman, 125 P. 3d 15 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 618 
S.E.2d 347 (Va. Ct. App. 2005). 
In particular, Oregon held in Norman that Crawford and State v. 
Mack, 101 P. 3d 349 (Ore. 2004) set the "parameters for determining 
whether evidence is 'testimonial in nature' under the Sixth Amendment" 
and those parameters are not satisfied by Intoxilyzer certifications. 
125 P.3d at 18. First, the certifications are not intended to be used 
to convict a particular defendant of a crime but are evidence of the 
accuracy of a test result arrived at by a machine. Evidence of the 
accuracy of a test result does not implicate the methodology of police 
or prosecutorial examinations of potential witnesses, as the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned about Id. Second, the technicians 
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were not acting as proxy for the police in their investigative 
functions, they were merely ensuring that the machines operated properly 
and provided accurate results. "Unlike police or prosecutorial 
interrogators, the technicians have not demonstrable interest in whether 
the certifications produce evidence that is favorable or adverse to a 
particular defendant." Td. at 18-19. Finally, exceptions for admission 
of Intoxilyzer certifications parallel the historical hearsay exceptions 
that were deemed non-testimonial, particularly the business records 
exception. Id. at 19. 
The Court is persuaded by Norman, et. al. that Crawford would not 
change the result in Hall because § 41-6a-515 only admits 
Certifications which are non-testimonial because they were not prepared 
to be used against a particular defendant, they are not based on 
subjective factors such as police interrogation methods, and Section 41-
6a-515 is derived from the historical business records hearsay 
exception.3 Additionally, the Court finds that this holding resolves the 
other problem with Hall, that it indicated that the State had not 
violated the Confrontation Clause because the defendant could call the 
technician to testify. Because the Certifications are non-testimonial, 
Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not violated even though he 
cannot call Trooper Camacho to testify. 
Defendant relies on a number a number of cases from other 
jurisdictions which found "breath test affidavits" inadmissible. 
However, Defendant's reliance is misplaced. Specifically, Defendant 
relies on People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 8 A.D.3d 888 (2004) and 
Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005). The Court is 
persuaded by Bohsancurt's specific distinction of those cases. 
Bohsancurt held that Rogers was distinguishable because "it held that . 
laboratory reports are testimonial, [but such] reports [are] 
inculpatory in a way that calibration and maintenance records are not. 
. . . In contrast to the types of reports involved in [Rogers] , the 
recorded results of calibration testing in the abstract do not relate to 
any specific defendant or particular case." 129 P. 3d at 478. 
Bohsancurt also distinguished Shiver by saying, 
[a]Ithough at first blush it appears Shiver dealt with records 
similar to Arizona's QARs. The Florida records actually 
included breath-test results of the individual defendant in 
3
 The City argues that, if Section 41-6a-515 is invalidated, the Certifications/Affidavits 
are also admissible under the business records exception. The Court does not reach this issue 
because it finds that Section 41-6a-515 is constitutional 
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addition to a section in which the officer who conducted the 
breath-test had certified that another officer had calibrated 
and checked the machine. Those facts are clearly 
distinguishable from those presented here. 
Id. at 478 n.6. The Court finds that the other cases cited by Defendant 
are clearly distinguishable for the same reasons offered to distinguish 
Rogers. 
Defendant also relies heavily on State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, 122 
P. 3d 63 9. In Workman, Christine Wright of the Utah State Crime 
Laboratory personally took samples of substances, etc. from a home where 
officers had served a search warrant. Wright then analyzed the samples 
and positively identified meth and meth precursors. Id. at H 2. On the 
day of trial, Wright was unavailable and the State sought to have 
Wright's supervisor, Jennifer McNair, testify as a substitute witness. 
Id. at f 5. The Utah Supreme Court found it was error to allow McNair 
to testify in place of Wright for three reasons. First, the nature of 
the testing was subjective (the tests depended "upon subjective 
inferences by the testing party, based, as McNair testified, on their 
'training and experience.7 id. at 1f 15). Id. at ff 13-15. Second, 
given the nature of the tests, it would have been every difficult for 
the defendants to challenge the evidence without cross-examining those 
personally involved in the testing. Id. at |^ 17. Specifically, because 
of the subjective element of the testing, the defendants should have 
been allowed to ask questions about whether the testing was conducted 
properly. Id. at |U 17-18. Additionally, Defendant was not able to 
prepare for Wright's absence because it was only announced on the day of 
the trial. Id. at f 18. Finally, the testing involved in this case was 
materially different from testing in other cases where the court allowed 
substitute witnesses in that the testing was not based on "promulgated, 
rigid guidelines and standards." Id. at ^ 19-20. 
It is clear to the Court that Workman is distinct from this case 
for a number of reasons. First, unlike Wright who collected evidence 
and tested it with regard to a specific case, Trooper Camacho did not 
perform the inspection in order to test a specific defendant or to aid 
in a specific prosecution. Second, there is no evidence that the 
testing done by Trooper Camacho involved any subjective elements. 
Instead, it appears that the testing is based on "promulgated, rigid 
guidelines and standards," making it more like cases where expert 
witnesses were allowed to substitute for one another. Third, because 
there was no subjective element to Trooper Camacho7s testing, this is 
not the type of evidence that Defendant needs to be allowed to cross 
examine upon. Fourth, there is no special prejudice to Defendant 
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because Trooper Camacho's absence was announced well in advance of 
trial. Finally, the City does not seek to "substitute" one expert for 
another, as in Workman (and Shiver) . Instead, Camacho will still be 
"testifying," he will simply be testifying via affidavit. 
Por the foregoing reasons-, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion 
in Limine should be DENIED and the City should be allowed to present 
Trooper Camacho's Certifications/Affidavits. 
<LLP\ 
